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CASE NOTES
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Delineation of the Relevant Market under
Section 7.---Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC.1—Petitioner, Reynolds Metals
Company, an integrated producer of aluminum, is the largest producer of
aluminum foil in the world.2 Reynolds and other major raw foil producers
sell in quantity to intermediaries known as converters, who purchase "jumbo"
rolls, break them down, and process them with decorative and other features
sought by the end users. Arrow Brands, Incorporated, a converter engaged
in selling processed foil to wholesale florist supply houses throughout the
country, was acquired by Reynolds in 1956. At the time of the acquisition,
while roughly 200 foil converters were active in the United States, only
eight, including Arrow, served the florist industry. Of approximately 192
million pounds of domestic converted foil shipped in 1956, roughly 9.7 mil-
lion pounds was composed of decorative foil of all kinds and less than
1.5 million pounds or about two million dollars was consumed by the florist
foil trade. Arrow accounted for thirty-three per cent of these total sales.
Although decorative foil, as such, may be used for tape, candy box liners,
covers for take-out food stuffs and many other purposes, it is not physically
distinguishable from florist foil which is used mainly to decorate flower
pots. All decorative foil, including florist foil, is gauged at approximately
the same thickness, .00065 inches. 3
In a proceeding instituted by the Federal Trade Commission, in which
Reynolds was charged with a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4
the Commission's examiner found that Reynold's acquisition of the stock
and assets of Arrow would have the effect of substantially lessening com-
petition in the production and sale of aluminum foil to the florist trade, and
divestiture of certain stock and assets of Arrow was ordered. In measuring
the anti-competitive effects of the merger, the examiner did not base his
findings on the fact that thirty-three per cent of the florist foil converting
industry would be foreclosed to other manufacturers of raw foil. Rather,
actual anti-competitive effects were found to have occurred, "where as an
apparent consequence of retroactive price reductions for Arrow foil after
the acquisition . . . florist foil sales of five of Arrow's seven competitors had
by 1957 dropped from 1470 to 47% below 1955 sales. Arrow sales over the
same period increased by 18.9%."5
On appeal, Reynolds contended that the Commission erred in defining
the relevant market in which to measure the competitive effects of the
merger and in holding that florist foil was the relevant line of commerce. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's cease and desist order. HELD: Al-
though florist foil is not distinguishable from decorative foil on the basis of use
1 Trade Reg. Rep. 1; 70,471 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2 Reynolds' foil production of 117 million pounds per year formed 40.5% of the
total foil production in the United States. In 1957 Reynolds led the Aluminum Company
of America by 37 million pounds in capacity for foil production. Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation was third.
3 Supra note 1, at 11 76,928.
4 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
Supra note 1, at	 76,926.
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and quality, in terms of (1) public and industrial recognition of it as a
separate economic entity, (2) its distinct pricing and (3) its distinct cus-
tomers, florist foil markets may be legitimately separated from aluminum
foil markets generally, and thus may be appropriately viewed as the area
in which the proscribed activity occurred.
In the twelve years that have elapsed since the adoption by Congress
of the celebrated Celler-Kefauver Amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,° such terms as "product interchangeability," "cross-elasticity of de-
mand" and "production flexibility" have become increasingly important
struts within the framework of section 7 litigation. In effect, the basic
objectives behind the 1950. act were three: (1) to "plug the loophole" 7
that had existed under the 1914 act, which applied only to the acquisition
of stock of other corporations and did not apply to direct acquisitions of
assets; (2) to delete the "acquiring-acquired" language of the original
section, with the consequent congressional indication that section 7 would
not only apply to horizontal mergers, 8 but also to vertical° and conglomerate
mergers" which may tend to lessen competition in any line of commerce in
8
 For a comparison of the original and amended section 7, brackets indicate deletions,
italics indicate additions.
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital • and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be [to] substantially to lessen competition [between the cor-
poration making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section
or community], or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of commerce].
Supra note 4.
7 "The bill is not complicated. It proposes simply to plug the loophole in sections 7
and 11 of the Clayton Act." Hearings on H.R. 515, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The
Senate Report on the measure summarized the "Purpose" of the amendment as follows:
"Since the acquisition of stock is significant chiefly because it is likely to result in control
of the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchases of the same assets has been
inconsistent and paradoxical as to the over-all effect of existing law." S. Rep. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
8 An economic arrangement between companies performing similar functions
in the production or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as
'horizontal' . . . . Where the arrangement effects a horizontal merger between
companies occupying the same product and geographic market, whatever com-
petition previously may have existed in that market between the parties to the
merger is eliminated.
Infra note 16, at 334-35.
9 Economic arrangements between companies standing in a supplier-customer
relationship are characterized as 'vertical.' The primary vice of a vertical merger
or other arrangement tying a customer to a supplier is that, by foreclosing the
competitors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to
them, the arrangement may act as a 'clog on competition' ... which 'deprive[s]
.. rivals of a fair opportunity to compete' . . . Every extended vertical
arrangement by its very nature, for at least a time, denies to competitors of the
supplier the opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade of the customer-
party to the vertical arrangement.
Infra note 16, at 323-24. The Reynolds-Arrow merger is an example of a vertical merger.
10 This type of merger involves two companies operating on different functional
levels either in different geographic markets or different industries, Its effects are more
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any section of the country;" (3) to stem the rising tide of economic con-
centration in the American economy 12
 by creating an effective tool for
preventing all mergers having demonstrable anti-competitive effects."
Nevertheless, Congress' failure to address itself specifically to the ques-
tion of precisely what would have to be demonstrated in order to establish a
section 7 violationm and the courts' reluctance to engage in economic analyses
have apparently provided the Government with an indefensible weapon
rather than a useful tool, as was originally conceived." The Reynolds
case is strikingly reflective of the economic oversimplification effectuated
by the judiciary. The impact of the decision, particularly following in the
heels of the Brown Shoe opinion," is clear. However, before discussing the
case and its ramifications, it would be best to lay the groundwork by defining
the above-mentioned section 7 terms.
Determination of the relevant market in which to predict the probable
competitive effect of a merger is a prerequisite to finding a violation of
section 7. 17
 Yet, the problem of defining the boundaries of the relevant
market is subtle and revolves on discovering patterns of trade which are
likely to be felt in the horizontal markets of the merging firms. Congress recognized the
likely effects of such a merger, although referring to it as a "forward-vertical" acquisition:
"If, for example, one or a number of raw material producers purchases firms in a
fabricating field and if as a result thereof competition in that fabricating field is sub-
stantially lessened in any section of the country, the law would be violated." H.R. Rep.
No. 1191, infra note 11.
11
 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
12
 That the current merger movement [during the years 1940-1947] has had a
significant effect on the economy is clearly revealed by the fact that the asset
value of the companies which have disappeared through mergers amounts to
5.2 billion dollars, or no less than 5.5 per cent of the total assets of all manu-
facturing corporations—a significant segment of the economy to be swallowed
up in such a short period of time.
Id. at 3.
13
 The bill is intended to permit intervention . when the effect of an acquisi-
tion may be a significant reduction in the vigor of competition, even though
this effect may not be so far reaching as to amount to a combination in re-
straint of trade, create a monopoly, or constitute an attempt to monopolize.
Such an effect may arise [by an] increase in the relative size of the enterprise
. to such a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be
decisive, undue reduction in the number of competing enterprises, or establish-
ment of relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals of
a fair opportunity to compete.
H.R. Rep. No. 1191, supra note 11, at 8.
14
 Section 7's lack of qualitative or quanitative tests was a prime target of attacks
by opponents of the measure. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1775, supra note 7, at 20-21 (dis-
senting views of Senator Donnell).
15 It would be impossible in the space allotted to trace the amended section 7's
judicial metamorphosis. There are, however, numerous articles on the general subject.
E.g., Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1960) ; Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver
Act—A Look at the Record, 7 Mercer L. Rev. 279 (1956) ; Handler & Robinson, A Decade
of the Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629
(1961) ; Lewyn & Mann, Ten Years Under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act (1961).
16 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
17 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
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followed in practice." Accordingly, the delineation of the relevant market
must be made on a case by case basis." Although the statute does not
contain the word "market," it does specify the two basic dimensions of a
relevant market; (1) the product dimension, designated by the phrase
"line of commerce" and (2) the geographic dimension, designated by the
phrase "section of the country." 2° Until recently the test for delineating the
product dimension of the relevant market involved measuring the inter-
changeability of products from other markets with those in the market
which the Government was seeking to define and limit," as well as the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. 22
Consequently, the geographic dimension was considered to be subordinate
to the product dimension in that the sales area would often be governed
by product interchangeability.' Also tied to the inquiry as to interchange-
ability was the concept of "production flexibility." Supporters of this
doctrine contend that if manufacturers of the product which the Govern-
ment has selected as the relevant market have the facilities to easily
shift production to other items, then these items should also be included
within the relevant market. This test, although successfully applied in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 24 was rejected in later cases. 25
After the delineation of the "line of commerce" has been made, it is
then necessary to determine the actual or probable competitive effects of the
merger." These effects will vary to some extent according to the type of merger
18 United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 186 F.
Supp. 576, 588 (1958).
19 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 730 (ED. Mo. 1959).
20 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 18, at 587-88.
21 "The market which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly
power will vary with the part of commerce under consideration. The tests are constant.
That market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the
purposes for which they are produced—price, use and qualities considered." United States
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co,, 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
22 A prime factor to he considered in determining the cross-elasticity of demand
between products is the responsiveness of' the sales of one product to price changes of
the other, As the Supreme Court pointed out in one case: "If a slight decrease in the
price of cellophane causes a considerable number of customers of other flexible wrappings
to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand
exists between them; that the products compete in the same market." Id. at 400.
23 Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961). The importance
of product interchangeability in governing the section of the country in which the com-
petitive effects of the merger are to he measured was borne out in Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961). There the court rejected product inter-
changeability and classified the relevant market as "census coarse papers" thus encom-
passing an eleven state area rather than all the states west of the Mississippi, as would
have been the case had "trade coarse papers" been included in the relevant product
market.
24 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
25 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 18; Crown Zellerbach Corp.
v. FTC, supra note 23.
28 It is interesting to note that there are those who would apply a "quantitative
substantiality" test to every type merger (see Handler, supra note 15). The test would
result in a per se violation of section 7 should it be found that the merger resulted in a
capture of a certain percentage or share of the relevant market. The term "quantitative
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consummated, i.e., horizonta1,27
 vertical" or conglomerate. 2 °
Formerly, "reasonable interchangeability," "cross-elasticity of demand"
and "production flexibility" were major defenses to a section 7 suit. By
employing these devices, the defense was permitted to delineate a broad
market and thereby show minimum competitive injury as a result of the
merger. As a consequence of a series of section 7 suits, 3° culminating in
the instant case, the effectiveness of these defensive weapons appears to be
sharply reduced if not entirely wanting. The use of the "reasonable inter-
changeability" or "substitute products" concept received its greatest legal
impetus in the 1956 Cellophane decisions' which concerned the Sherman
Act." In that case, the Supreme Court defined the relevant market as
flexible packaging materials rather than cellophane itself. The importance
of the "reasonable interchangeability" concept to the respondent's defense
in that case can be seen when considering that cellophane itself constituted
less than twenty per cent of the relevant market, but duPont manufactured
nearly .seventy-five per cent of all cellophane products. In the duPont-
General Motors case,33
 a pre-1950 section 7 proceeding, the Supreme Court
did not discuss "reasonable interchangeability" but rather held that
"automotive finishes and fabrics . . . [were] sufficiently distinct from all
other finishes and fabrics to make them a 'line of commerce' within the
meaning of the Clayton Act." 34 Again the importance of "reasonable inter-
changeability" is emphasized, for had the Court accepted the concept,
duPont would have been found to have accounted for only 3.5 per cent
and 1.6 per cent of all the industry sales of finishes and fabrics, respec-
tively," rather than the approximately thirty-four per cent and nineteen
per cent of the automotive finish and fabric business which the Court
found traceable to duPont 3° In the Crown-Zellerbach case," the "reasonable
interchangeability" doctrine was again rejected, the court holding that
census coarse paper was the relevant market rather than the broader trade
coarse paper line of commerce. Again in the recent Brown Shoe opinion,"
the Supreme Court dispelled any doubts as to the effectiveness of a "reason-
able interchangeability" or a "substitute products" defense. Although the
approach taken was different than in prior cases, the effect was the same.
The Court acknowledged that the broad product market is to be determined
substantiality" developed from cases decided under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which
relates to tie-ins and exclusive dealing contracts. See Standard OiI Co. v. United States,
333 U.S. 293 (1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
27 For a definition of horizontal mergers, see supra note 8.
28 For a definition of vertical mergers, see supra note 9.
29 For a definition of conglomerate mergers, see supra note 10.
30 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 16; United States v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., supra note 17; United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
supra note 21; Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 23.
31 Supra note 21.
82 26 Stat: 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
83 Supra note 17.
34 Id. at 592.
36 Id. at 593.
86 Id. at 596.
37 Supra note 23.
38 Supra note 16.
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by the use of the "reasonable interchangeability" and "production flexibility"
concepts. However, the Court went on to say that "within this broad market,
well defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product
markets for anti-trust purposes . . . because Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition in any
`line of commerce'."'" Consequently, the Court rejected the claim that
"footwear" should be the relevant market and held the line of commerce to
be "men's,- women's and children's shoes."
Thus the Reynolds decision should come as no surprise. Brown sug-
gested that "the boundaries of . . a submarket may be determined by
examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar character-
istics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct
prices, sensitivity to price changes and specialized vendors."" The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has now applied these indicia to the
instant case.
Despite agreeing with the petitioner's contention that florist foil can
not be distinguished from decorative foil on the basis of physical character-
istics and use, the court held that the florist foil converting industry was a
distinctly separable line of commerce based upon distinct pricing, purchaser
identity, and industry and consumer recognition. It would seem to follow
that if the products are similar in all respects, pricing and consumer identity
should also be indistinguishable. This then would appear to be the anomaly
of the decision. The court does not come to grips with the reasons behind
the pricing structure of aluminum foil, although it is obvious that there is
more to the situation than meets the eye. Had the court delved into the
economic considerations of the situation and attempted to pry loose the
reason for the failure of decorative foil consumers to substitute and thereby
gain price advantage (although in most cases paying prices of thirty per
cent to forty per cent higher than those charged to consumers of florist
foil), then perhaps a different decision might have resulted.
Whereas Reynolds makes it clear that the concept of "reasonable
interchangeability" is passing from the section 7 scene, it would also appear
that Reynolds has "mothered" a new concept. As Brown Shoe had suggested
that submarkets might exist within the broad market for section 7 purposes,
Reynolds suggests that "actual interchangeability" is a prime factor that
must be considered within the wider and decaying concept of "reasonable
interchangeability." The court, in determining the relevant market, decided
that since consumers did not actually interchange or substitute florist foil
for decorative foil, or vice versa, their failure to do so limited the "line of
commerce."41
 The additional factor of "potential interchangeability" of the
foils was not considered.
Thus, Reynolds not only deprives defendants in section 7 suits of the
use of "reasonable interchangeability," but also of the concept of "production
39 Id. at 325.
40
 Ibid.
41 Supra note 1, at 11 76,927.
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flexibility." For in viewing the relevant market from the consumer's view-
point,-02
 the court apparently deemed that "production flexibility," as
viewed by the manufacturer, need not be reckoned with. In effect, Reynolds
is following Brown Shoe in bolding that even though a rival florist foil
converter may easily shift to the manufacture of decorative foil, this will
not aid a consumer of florist foil who must still purchase in a market where
competition is substantially lessened.
This position seems highly untenable. Even assuming that consumer
injury should be the prime concern of the courts, "production flexibility"
need not be dispensed with. For, applying a converse "production flexibility"
principle, if producers of another product are easily able to shift to the
production of the product which the Government has selected as the relevant
market (and this is the case here),43
 then injury to consumers is de minimus,
if not totally illusory. Further, it is submitted that market injury is im-
probable in a situation where "product interchangeability" is apparently
nonexistent at the time of the suit, but future "product interchangeability"
seems likely. Thus in the instant situation, where use and quality of the
two products are indistinguishable, "product interchangeability" seems
imminent. The fact that a pricing disparity exists between the products is, of
course, critical to the future interchangeability of the foils. In this light
the court's failure to delve into the pricing structure of foil, generally, is
even more glaring.
In conclusion, a submarket delineation concept as suggested in Brown
Shoe and an "actual product interchangeability" test as applied in Reynolds
allows the Government the opportunity to pick and choose a "line of com-
merce" in which to easily measure and prove actual or probable anti-
competitive effects of a merger. It is apparent that such an advantage may
well prove to be insurmountable. 44 If a section 7 suit is to remain clothed
42 Again we find the instant court following the majority in Brown who were
also more concerned with the interests of the consumer. Cf., Mr. Justice Harlan's separate
opinion in Brown where he advocated the test of "production flexibility" as "a more
realistic gauge of the possible anticompetitive effects [of a merger]." Supra note 16, at 367.
The consumer viewpoint approach as taken by the Brown and Reynolds courts is a rela-
tively recent development. As late as 1961 some courts viewed possible injury to com-
petitors as their ultimate concern. Thus in Crown Zellerbach the court said:
Congress was . . . concerned about the competitor, . . . the small business man
whose 'little independent units are gobbled up by bigger ones,' and about other
competitors whose opportunities to meet the prices of the larger concern and
hence compete with it might be diminished by a merger which increased the
concentration of power in the larger organization.
Supra note 23, at 825.
43 "The Government concedes that theoretically all 200 converters could supply
florist foil ...." Supra note 1, at 	 76,924.
44 An example of such criticism is an article entitled "The Growing Threat of Anti-
trust" by Silvester Petro, which appeared in the November 1962 issue of Fortune maga-
zine. The author quotes Professor Milton Handler of Columbia as saying, in regard to
the FTC: "Today the Commission aspires to outlaw any business practice it regards as
ethically wrong or economically undesirable. Just as we can not permit the past to rule
the present, we can not accept the assertion of a censorious authority that knows no
limits." Fortune, Nov. 1962, p. 130.
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in the dignity of an adversary proceeding, it is submitted that a rebirth of the
"reasonable product interchangeability" concept is needed. 45
STUART R. Ross
Antitrust—Sherman Act—Tie-in Contracts.—United States v. Loew's,
Inc.'—In 1957, the United States brought separate actions under Section
4 of the Sherman Act2 against six major distributors3 of pre-1948 motion
picture films which had been released for television exhibition. The defend-,
ants in each suit were charged with having engaged in "block booking" 4
in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.° The Government sought in-
junctive relief prohibiting each defendant from refusing to sell or license
feature films to television stations on an individual basis as well as such
other relief as might be necessary for the restoration of competition. The
district court entered separate decrees enjoining each distributor from con-
ditioning the purchase or license of the right to exhibit any feature film
upon the purchase or license of any other film and from entering into an
agreement wherein the price differential between a desired film and a block
of films was such that it had the effect of illegal block booking.° On appeal
the film distributors, with the exception of National Telefilm, challenged
45 it should be pointed out that two months following the Commission's divestiture
order, Reynolds petitioned the Commission to reopen the proceeding for purposes of
adducing new and additional evidence. Reynolds sought to introduce evidence that a,
division of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. and a division of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. had expanded their florist foil activities since the close of hearings in October 1958.
Reynolds hoped to show that these new entries, having competitive strength comparable
to Reynolds, reinforced its argument that the acquisition of Arrow had not had the
effect of a probable lessening of competition or a tendency toward a monopoly.
In denying the petition (Matter of Reynolds Metals Co., FTC Docket 7009, Opinion
of Commission on Petition to Reopen Proceeding (March, 1960)) the Commission
held, inter alb:4 that "Even though subsequent events may show that future competitive
conditions are not as anticipated, this would not make legal that which was illegal, nor
relieve the respondent of the consequences of its action, unlawful as of the time of
trial." In an article entitled "Significant New Commission Developments" (17 A.B.A.
Antitrust Section 274, 276), Hon. Edward T. Tait, Commissioner, FTC, points out that
"Broadly speaking, the Reynolds petition also raises serious questions in balancing the
rights of a respondent as to after-discovered evidence with the necessity for some end
to litigation."
1 83 Sup. Ct. 97 (1962).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
3 The distributors were Loew's, Inc., C & C Super Corp., Screen Gems, Inc.,
Associated Artists Productions, Inc., National Telefilm Associates, Inc. and United
Artists Corporation.
4 The complaints defined "block booking" as the licensing of feature films to tele-
vision stations in a block whereby the licensing of one feature film is conditioned upon
the licensing of one or more other feature films.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat, 209 (1890), '15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), provides
in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. .. ."
6
 159 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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